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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Petitioner Roscoe Parrish waived his right to a jury trial 
in return for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's 
agreement not to seek the death penalty. He was convicted 
of first degree murder and criminal conspiracy and was 
sentenced to life in prison. In his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus and before us, Parrish argues that waiver of 
his federal constitutional right to a jury trial, induced by 
the prosecution's pledge not to seek the death penalty, 
violated his federal constitutional right to due process. He 
further contends that his trial counsel was ineffective "for 
failing to secure a valid constitutional waiver of a jury trial 
colloquy, for participating and advising [Parish] in such 
negotiations, and for allowing the trade-off to even be a 
factor in the decision to waive or not to waive trial by jury," 
Pet'r Br. at 12, and for failing to raise this issue on direct 
appeal. The Petitioner has exhausted all of his available 
state remedies on each of his claims for relief. See 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(b); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 
1198 (1982). 
 
It is axiomatic that Parrish is entitled to reasonably 
effective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, a defendant is 
only entitled to habeas relief if he can establish that 
counsel's ineffectiveness resulted in some harm or 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 
S. Ct. 2052, 2964 (1984). This applies to representations 
made during the plea process as well as the trial process. 
Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985); 
see also Bivens v. Brosse, 28 F.3d 62, 63 (8th Cir. 1994). 
The legal component of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim in the habeas context is subject to plenary review. 
McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 1993). 
In reviewing counsel's performance, our scrutiny must be 
"highly deferential," and not "second-guess counsel's 
assistance after conviction." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 
104 S. Ct. at 2065. Specifically, we must "judge the 
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts 
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of the particular case, reviewed as of the time of counsel's 
conduct." Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Sistrunk v. 
Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Parrish argues that United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 
570, 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968), supports his argument that 
waiver of the federal constitutional right to a jury trial, 
when induced by the prosecution's pledge not to pursue the 
death penalty, violates due process. We do not agree. In 
Jackson, the Court examined the Federal Kidnaping Act, 
which provided for the death penalty only after a jury trial. 
390 U.S. at 571, 88 S. Ct. 1210. Under that provision, a 
defendant who waived a jury trial was assured that he 
would not be executed. Id. at 582, 88 S. Ct. at 1216. The 
Court held that the inevitable effect of the provision was to 
excessively deter the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right 
to demand a jury trial, and found the capital punishment 
provision of the Act unconstitutional. Id. 
 
The Court explicitly limited Jackson two years later in 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463 
(1970): 
 
       "We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is 
       compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment 
       whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept 
       the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather 
       than face a wider range of possibilities extending from 
       acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized 
       by law for the crime charged." 
 
Id. at 751, 90 S. Ct. at 1470. Although Brady involved a 
plea of guilty rather than a waiver of right to a jury trial, 
the Court noted that a guilty plea involves the waiver of the 
right to a jury trial as well as the waiver of the right not to 
incriminate oneself. Id. at 748, 90 S. Ct. at 1469. The Court 
explicitly held that "a plea of guilty is not invalid merely 
because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty." 
Id. at 755, 90 S. Ct. at 1472. Indeed, the Court made clear 
in North Carolina v. Alford that "Jackson established no new 
test for determining the validity of guilty pleas. The 
standard was and remains whether the plea represents a 
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 
courses of action open to the defendant." 400 U.S. 25, 31, 
91 S. Ct. 160, 164 (1970). 
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Here, as in Brady, there is no allegation that the 
Commonwealth threatened prosecution on a charge not 
justified by the evidence, nor threatened a more onerous 
penalty than indicated by the facts for the purpose of 
obtaining an unfair advantage in negotiating with Parish's 
counsel. Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 n.8, 90 S. Ct. at 1470 n.8. 
That being the case, counsel was not ineffective for"failing 
to secure a valid constitutional waiver of a jury trial 
colloquy, for participating and advising [Parish] in such 
negotiations, and for allowing the trade-off to even be a 
factor in the decision to waive or not to waive trial by jury." 
Pet'r Br. at 12. It follows that we do not deem it ineffective 
assistance for counsel to have so proceeded. And on direct 
appeal, counsel assistance does not become ineffective by 
failing to raise an issue when convincing Supreme Court 
case law shows it to be without merit. See Moore v. Deputy 
Comm'rs of SCI Huntingdon, 946 F.2d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 
1991) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for 
failure to object to charge that he was justified on basis of 
evidence). 
 
In sum, the district court followed these standards and 
denied the petitioner relief. We will affirm. 
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